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HUMEANIZING KANT'S AESTHETICS 
Richard Fumerton 
I ALMOST ALWAYS FEEL that I understand Hume and I am almost 
never confident that I understand Kant. As a kind of interpretive tool, 
when I read Kant I always ask myself a) what Hume would have thought 
about the subject matter under discussion, and b) how Hume would have 
tried to explain Kant's views had they been his own. In these few brief 
comments I want to try to understand a certain part of Kant's aesthetics by 
asking myself in what ways it differs from the corresponding part of 
Hume. 
Let me begin with a couple of disclaimers. The first and most important is 
that I am not a Kant scholar, and when I talk about my interpretation of 
Kant's aesthetics I mean only to report the view that keeps suggesting 
itself to me on a reading of the primary literature. 
The second disclaimer concerns the part of Kant's aesthetics to which I 
want to restrict my comments. In effect I want to compare Hume's and 
Kant's meta-aesthetic views. I want to compare their views about the 
meaning of aesthetic judgments. Just as in ethics it seems possible to distin 
guish two sorts of questions, meta-ethical questions (questions dealing 
with the meaning of ethical statements) and normative ethical questions 
(questions dealing with the things or kinds of things to which ethical 
terms 
apply), so too it seems possible to distinguish questions about the 
meaning of aesthetic judgments (meta-aesthetic judgments) from ques 
tions about the things to which our aesthetic concepts apply. The diffi 
culty with asking questions about Kant's meta-aesthetic views is simply 
that he didn't explicitly make the distinction. Yet as the father of the ana 
lytic/synthetic distinction, he was certainly in a position to recognize it. 
We could ask him to distinguish truths about the concept of beauty from 
truths about the various forms and structures that we can correctly con 
clude are beautiful. But the distinction is nevertheless not explicitly made 
as far as I can see in the Critique of Judgment and I am never quite sure 
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Whereas Kant spent the better part of a book dealing with aesthetic 
judgments, Hume devotes only a subsection of his Treatise of Human 
Nature to the analysis of judgments about beauty. His meta-aesthetic view 
seems very similar to his meta-ethical view. Both judgments about virtue 
and vice, and beauty and deformity, for Hume, seem to reduce to judg 
ments about the way in which we respond with pleasure and satisfaction 
or their opposites to the conception or perception of things. About vice 
Hume says in Book III, Part I, Section I of the Treatise: 
So that when you pronounce any action or character to be 
vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of 
your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the 
contemplation of it. 
About beauty Hume says in Book II, Part I, Section VIII of the Treatise: 
. . . beauty is such an order and construction of parts, as either 
by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, 
is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. 
In the case of virtue and vice Hume explicitly links his view to the preva 
lent views about secondary qualities, and I assume he would treat aesthetic 
properties similarly. The distinction between primary and secondary quali 
ties was recognized by many of Hume's and Kant's contemporaries. The 
rough idea is that some properties of physical objects (the primary prop 
erties) are literally present in the objects as well as being represented in the 
minds of conscious beings, while other properties of objects (the sec 
ondary properties) exist in objects only as the power to produce in con 
scious beings certain psychological states. The sourness of the lemon, for 
example, exists only in the lemon as the power to produce in people cer 
tain sensations. If there were no people to respond with taste sensations, 
there would be no sourness in the lemon. In extending the analogy to 
moral and aesthetic properties, Hume was suggesting that the virtue or 
beauty of something exists in that thing only as the power to produce in 
people certain affective responses. The details of the interpretation of 
Hume are by no means uncontroversial. The secondary quality analogy 
suggests that he takes the relevant dispositions that define virtue and 
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beauty to be identified with those of "normal" or "standard" people, but 
there are other (I think more persuasive) passages that suggest that Hume 
was 
endorsing a radical relativism often summarized by the clich? that 
beauty is in the eye of the beholder?a clich? that, I think, essentially 
captures the philosophically important truth about aesthetic properties. 
To what extent does Kant's meta-aesthetics lend itself to a similar kind of 
secondary property analysis? Like Hume, Kant was obviously sympathetic 
to the idea that it is through a certain kind of subjective feeling that one 
makes aesthetic judgments. Unlike Hume (or at least my interpretation of 
Hume) he clearly didn't want to endorse either the radical relativistic view 
or even the view that we can understand assertions about beauty in terms 
of assertions about the dispositions of "normal" people to react with a cer 
tain kind of pleasure upon the perception of things. In his discussion of the 
antinomy of taste Kant refers with obvious sarcasm to the Humean view 
that judgments of taste are radically subjective and relative: 
The following proposition contains the first of these [common 
place views about taste] and is used by everyone who lacks taste 
but tries to escape censure: Everyone has his own taste. (210) 
The implication of such a view is that there is nothing to argue about when 
it comes to aesthetics. If when you say that something is beautiful you 
mean 
only to assert that you are disposed to react to it with a certain kind 
of satisfaction or pleasure and when I deny that the same thing is beautiful 
I mean only to assert that I don't have that disposition, then clearly you 
and I are not contradicting each other and there doesn't seem to be any 
thing to argue about. Yet clearly Kant thinks that there can be genuine 
disagreement over the aesthetic qualities of things. And of course he is 
right in suggesting that our aesthetic discourse would seem on the face of 
it to suggest that there are genuine aesthetic disputes. People do argue 
about whether a painting, for example, is beautiful or not, and they seem 
to argue as if there is some fact of the matter. 
The relativistic Humean obviously has difficulty accommodating this 
feature of aesthetic discourse which is of special concern to Kant. Nor does 
Kant allow himself to call upon the "standard person" analysis of aesthetic 
judgments. He explicitly rejects the view that "a judgment of taste 
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deserves to be considered correct only insofar as there happen to be many 
people agreeing on it" (219, his emphasis). It seems clear that his main 
concern with such a view (a view again modeled on the analysis of sec 
ondary properties) is that it misses the claim of necessary universal assent 
characteristic of our judgments about beauty. When I judge that an object 
is beautiful I am not merely predicting that as it so happens most other 
people will respond with a similar sort of pleasure. Rather I am, according 
to Kant, committed to the view that other people must respond in a similar 
way. In short Kant would have no objections to a Humean account of 
what it means to say of something that is merely agreeable or pleasant, but 
when we are talking about beauty we leave, if not subjectivity, at least 
relativity behind and advance claims of necessary universal assent. 
But do we need to leave the basic Humean model for understanding 
value judgments behind? As we all know, Kant insisted that to make an 
aesthetic judgment one must adopt a kind of disinterested perspective. In a 
number of places Kant seems to make clear that this involves a certain 
process of abstraction whereby we strip ourselves of all those idiosyncratic 
features that distinguish us from other conscious intellectual beings. The 
pleasure or satisfaction with which we react in making an aesthetic judg 
ment is the pleasure or satisfaction of a "pure" self or, one might say, a self 
qua self. 
Taste is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, 
by means of a liking or disliking devoid of all interest. The object 
of such a liking is called beautiful. (53) 
Now this is a rather epistemological way of putting the point. But if we 
ask what meta-aesthetic view it suggests it is surely the same kind of dis 
positional analysis that Hume put forth: 
To say of something that it is beautiful is to say that a com 
pletely disinterested observer would respond to it with satisfac 
tion. 
Such an account would still be in the spirit of a secondary quality analysis 
but it would differ from a Humean account or a "standard" person 
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account. Instead of talking about how the person judging would respond 
or how normal people would respond, Kant is talking about how disinter 
ested people would respond. If this were Kant's meta-aesthetic view then 
we could understand in a fairly clear way the sense in which an aesthetic 
judgment necessarily involves universality. If qua disinterested observer I 
respond in a certain way to something wouldn't it follow that any other 
disinterested observer would respond in the same way? It would in effect 
be an instance of the general principle (accepted as definitionally true even 
by Hume): same cause, same effect. Since there is nothing to distinguish 
me qua disinterested subject from you qua disinterested subject, you and I 
will of necessity respond in the same way to the same stimulus. 
Notice by the way that the view I sketched above is not only compatible 
with the general approach of a Humean account that tries to understand 
beauty in terms of the power to produce pleasure, but it is suggested in a 
very crude way by some of the things Hume says about value judgments. 
In Book III, Part II, Sec. II of the Treatise, after identifying the subject 
matter of value judgments with powers to produce certain sentiments, 
Hume adds an interesting qualification: 
Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from 
characters or actions, of that peculiar kind which makes us 
praise or condemn. . . . Tis only when a character is considered 
in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it 
causes such a feeling or sentiment as denominates it morally 
good or evil. 
I don't want to exaggerate the analogy but one can certainly see at least a 
bridge between this sort of view of value judgments and a Kantian concep 
tion of aesthetic judgments. 
Let me conclude these brief remarks by admitting that I have no great 
confidence that one can capture Kant's meta-aesthetic view in terms of his 
simply identifying the subject matter of aesthetic judgments with condi 
tional statements describing the way in which disinterested people would 
respond to certain forms and objects. It is after all difficult to square such 
an interpretation with all of the things Kant says about aesthetic judg 
ments, including his apparent insistence that one should contrast aesthetic 
judgments with cognitive judgments. On the other hand I suspect that if 
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Kant were Hume and Kant were trying to describe his meta-aesthetic 
view, the proposed analysis of aesthetic judgments would be a perfectly 
straightforward and natural way of presenting the fundamental Kantian 
thesis, a way of presenting it that would make the interpretation of Kant's 
aesthetics much easier. 
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